Some long-term, large-scale socio-economic changes may affect the politics of HIV and other emerging viruses such as hepatitis C. It is useful to ask why the potential peace dividend of the early 1990s failed to provide adequate resources for HIV-related social and medical service delivery in developed or developing nations. This failure can be understood by looking at long-term global economic trends and the pressures they put on governments and corporations. They have produced a period in which fundamental issues of political and economic structure are at stake and, often, the response is a divide-and-rule politics to promote stability. National politics differ in terms of the extent to which such a 'politics of scapegoating' is institutionalized and in terms of which groups are scapegoated. Groups such as drug injectors, gay and bisexual men and sex traders are particularly likely to be targeted both by the scapegoaters and by HIV. Given this framework, how should public health professionals and activists engaged in HIV-related issues respond? Under what circumstances should we orient efforts upwards towards corporate, political or bureaucratic leaders? Under what circumstances, and how, should we orient towards popular forces? Relatedly, we need to consider an issue we often ignore: What do we have to offer potential allies? That is, in terms of their goals, philosophies and needs, why should they ally with us?