Does a GP service package matter in addressing the absence of health management by the occupational population? A modelling study

Jing Guo; Ying Qian; Chen Chen; Hong Liang; Jiaoling Huang

doi:10.1186/s12913-024-10954-9

Does a GP service package matter in addressing the absence of health management by the occupational population? A modelling study

BMC Health Serv Res. 2024 May 17;24(1):638. doi: 10.1186/s12913-024-10954-9.

Authors

Jing Guo^#¹, Ying Qian^#², Chen Chen³, Hong Liang¹, Jiaoling Huang⁴

Affiliations

¹ School of Social Development and Public Policy of Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
² Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, China.
³ Pengpuxincun Community Health Service Center, Shanghai, China.
⁴ School of Public Health, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, China. jiaoling_huang@sina.com.

^# Contributed equally.

Abstract

Objective: To assess the influence of supply and demand factors on the contract behavior of occupational populations with general practitioner (GP) teams.

Methods: We employed a system dynamics approach to assess and predict the effect of the general practitioner service package (GPSP) and complementary incentive policies on the contract rate for 2015-2030. First, the GPSP is designed to address the unique needs of occupational populations, enhancing the attractiveness of GP contracting services, including three personalized service contents tailored to demand-side considerations: work-related disease prevention (WDP), health education & counseling (HEC), and health-care service (HCS). Second, the complementary incentive policies on the supply-side included income incentives (II), job title promotion (JTP), and education & training (ET). Considering the team collaboration, the income distribution ratio (IDR) was also incorporated into supply-side factors.

Findings: The contract rate is predicted to increase to 57.8% by 2030 after the GPSP intervention, representing a 15.4% increase on the non-intervention scenario. WDP and HEC have a slightly higher (by 2%) impact on the contract rate than that from HCS. Regarding the supply-side policies, II have a more significant impact on the contract rate than JTP and ET by 3-5%. The maximum predicted contract rate of 75.2% is expected by 2030 when the IDR is 0.5, i.e., the GP receives 50% of the contract income and other members share 50%.

Conclusion: The GP service package favorably increased the contract rate among occupational population, particularly after integrating the incentive policies. Specifically, for a given demand level, the targeted content of the package enhanced the attractiveness of contract services. On the supply side, the incentive policies boost GPs' motivation, and the income distribution motivated other team members.

Keywords: Contract rate; GP service package; Occupational population; Primary healthcare; System dynamics model.

MeSH terms

Contract Services
General Practice
General Practitioners*
Humans

Abstract

MeSH terms

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