How can governments and fishermen collaborate to participate in a fishing ban for ecological restoration?

Yong Sun; Zhongrui Sun; Yanmei Zhang; Qin Qiao

doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.120958

How can governments and fishermen collaborate to participate in a fishing ban for ecological restoration?

J Environ Manage. 2024 May 13:360:120958. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.120958. Online ahead of print.

Authors

Yong Sun¹, Zhongrui Sun², Yanmei Zhang³, Qin Qiao⁴

Affiliations

¹ School of Public Administration, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China; Institute of Rural Revitalization, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China. Electronic address: sunyong@gzhu.edu.cn.
² School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China; Yangtze Delta Region Academy (Jiaxing), Beijing Institute of Technology, Jiaxing 314001, China. Electronic address: sunzhongrui@bit.edu.cn.
³ School of Public Administration, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China. Electronic address: yanmei.cho@foxmail.com.
⁴ State Key Laboratory of Environmental Criteria and Risk Assessment, Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences,Beijing 100012,China. Electronic address: qin.qiao@outlook.com.

PMID: 38744206
DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.120958

Abstract

To safeguard aquatic ecosystems and fishery resources while facilitating cooperative engagement between local governments and fishermen, an evolutionary game model featuring both stakeholders has been constructed in this study. The model examines the degree of compliance with ecological restoration policies linked to fishing bans, as well as the adaptive strategies of different types of fishermen with varied incentives while simulating the ecological restoration policy under diverse scenarios. The findings suggest that: (1) Compliance with the fishing ban policy among fishermen is determined by their economic interests, environmental preferences, and government regulations, while its enforcement by local authorities is influenced by regulatory costs, political performance, and reputation. (2) Variations in the ecological restoration policy of fishing bans result from several factors, including punitive measures and compensation. The higher the penalty, the greater the chance of compliance among fishermen, and the higher the restoration degree of the watershed ecosystem. Conversely, the higher the compensation, the more satisfied the fishermen are with the fishing ban policy, and the smoother the transformation of their livelihoods. (3) To enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of fishing bans, it is essential to consider the interests of multiple stakeholders and adopt a coordination mechanism that facilitates the design of a reasonable and effective incentive-compatible system, thereby increasing the fairness and acceptability of the policy. This study provides a new theoretical framework and methodology applicable to ecological restoration policies for fishery closures on a global scale, accompanied by robust data support and theoretical guidance for developing and implementing fishery closure policies.

Keywords: Ecological protection; Evolutionary game; Fishermen; Fishing ban; Government; Yangtze river basin.