Recent years have seen an increase in governmental interference in digital communication. Most research on this topic has focused on the application level, studying how content is manipulated or removed on websites, blogs, or social media. However, in order for governments to obtain and maintain control of digital data flows, they need to secure access to the network infrastructure at the level of Internet service providers. In this paper, we study how the network topology of the Internet varies across different political environments, distinguishing between control at the level of individual Internet users (access) and a higher level in the hierarchy of network carriers (transit). Using a novel method to estimate the structure of the Internet from network measurements, we show that in autocratic countries, state-owned (rather than privately owned) providers have a markedly higher degree of control over transit networks. We also show that state-owned Internet providers often provide Internet access abroad, with a clear focus on other autocratic countries. Together, these results suggest that in autocracies, the network infrastructure is organized in a way that is more susceptible to the monitoring and manipulation of Internet data flows by state-owned providers both domestically and abroad.
© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences.