The quality of primary products in a supply chain is determined by the agent and the principal. Simultaneously, there are quota production constraints on the principals. Our discourse centers on the design of incentive contracts for agents within these supply chains. We derived the parameters describing the contract, level of effort, profits for both sides, and the minimum requirements of the principal for the proportion of high-quality primary products. This study compares the decision-making paradigms of agents and principals in various contexts. The results show that decision-making mechanisms are strongly influenced by individual effort costs, various internal and external organizational variables, and the interplay of efforts on both sides. Using numerical experiments, we investigate the effects of different situations between clients and contractors on contracting and effort strategies. The results show that when the agent exerts unilateral effort, reasonable incentive contracts can spur the agent to increase effort and thus increase the proportion of high-quality primary products. In the case of bilateral efforts, a well-calibrated contract design benefits the agent (bearing less risk). For the principal, the expected profit increases in most cases. When considering the quota production, it is necessary to set an appropriate limit on the proportion of high-quality primary products.
Keywords: Bilateral efforts; Information asymmetry; Principal-agent decision theory; Production quotas.
© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.