Rowhammer Attacks in Dynamic Random-Access Memory and Defense Methods

Dayeon Kim; Hyungdong Park; Inguk Yeo; Youn Kyu Lee; Youngmin Kim; Hyung-Min Lee; Kon-Woo Kwon

doi:10.3390/s24020592

Rowhammer Attacks in Dynamic Random-Access Memory and Defense Methods

Sensors (Basel). 2024 Jan 17;24(2):592. doi: 10.3390/s24020592.

Authors

Dayeon Kim¹, Hyungdong Park¹, Inguk Yeo¹, Youn Kyu Lee¹, Youngmin Kim², Hyung-Min Lee³, Kon-Woo Kwon¹

Affiliations

¹ Department of Computer Engineering, Hongik University, Seoul 04066, Republic of Korea.
² School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Hongik University, Seoul 04066, Republic of Korea.
³ School of Electrical Engineering, Korea University, Seoul 02841, Republic of Korea.

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the security vulnerability known as rowhammer in Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM). While DRAM offers many desirable advantages, including low latency, high density, and cost-effectiveness, rowhammer vulnerability, first identified in 2014, poses a significant threat to computing systems. Rowhammer attacks involve repetitive access to specific DRAM rows, which can cause bit flips in neighboring rows, potentially compromising system credentials, integrity, and availability. The paper discusses the various stages of rowhammer attacks, explores existing attack techniques, and examines defense strategies. It also emphasizes the importance of understanding DRAM organization and the associated security challenges.

Keywords: dynamic random-access memory; rowhammer; security; vulnerability.

Publication types

Review

Grants and funding

This work was supported as part of the Military Crypto Research Center (UD210027XD), funded by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). This work was supported in part by the BrainLink program funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT through the National Research Foundation of Korea (RS-2023-00237308) and in part by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) Grant funded by the Korean Government under Grant NRF-2023R1A2C2006290. This work was supported in part by Hongik University.