Low-carbon buildings (LCBs) are still in the early stages of development in China. The promotion and implementation of associated policies are not yet fully matured. Meanwhile, their status as public goods exacerbates the uncertainty and complexity regarding anticipated gains and potential losses. Few studies have explored the impact of perception parameters on the decision-making processes of LCBs' stakeholders. Thus, combined with prospect theory, this paper establishes a tripartite game model composed of governments, developers, and consumers to explore their interactions and influences in different stages. Real-life scenarios are further utilized to validate the effectiveness of the model in predicting the behaviors under respective preferences. The results show that the increase in subsidy and penalty intensity instead diminishes the enthusiasm for LCBs. More specifically, the existing subsidy policies offer limited incentives to consumers. With the addition of the perception parameter, there exist differences in the sensitivity of consumers and developers towards risk levels and potential losses. The findings also highlight the importance of consumers in the LCBs market. Future policies should encourage developers and consumers to jointly promote the LCBs implementation.
Keywords: Construction industry; Evolutionary game theory; Low-carbon; Prospect theory.
© 2024. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.