Dogs, Epistemic Indefensibility and Ethical Denial: Don't Let Sleeping Dog Owners Lie

David Shaw

doi:10.1007/s11673-023-10229-8

Dogs, Epistemic Indefensibility and Ethical Denial: Don't Let Sleeping Dog Owners Lie

J Bioeth Inq. 2023 Mar;20(1):7-12. doi: 10.1007/s11673-023-10229-8. Epub 2023 Feb 7.

Author

David Shaw^{1

2}

Affiliations

¹ Institute for Biomedical Ethics, University of Basel, Bernoullistrasse 28, 4056, Basel, Switzerland. David.shaw@unibas.ch.
² Care and Public Health Research Institute, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands. David.shaw@unibas.ch.

Abstract

In this paper I use normative analysis to explore the curious and seemingly singular phenomenon whereby some dog owners deny the physical and moral facts about a situation where it is claimed their dog harmed or irritated others. I define these as epistemic and ethical denial, respectively, and offer a tentative exploration of their implications in terms of relational autonomy and responsible behaviour in public spaces.

Keywords: Dog owners; Dogs; Epistemology; Ethics.

Publication types

Editorial