Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely applied in OECD countries to improve the quality of both primary and secondary care, and is increasingly being implemented in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, Brazil introduced one of the largest P4P schemes in the world, the National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We critically assess the design of PMAQ, drawing on a comparison with England's quality and outcome framework which, like PMAQ, was implemented at scale relatively rapidly within a nationalised health system. A key feature of PMAQ was that payment was based on the performance of primary care teams but rewards were given to municipalities, who had autonomy in how the funds could be used. This meant the incentives felt by family health teams were contingent on municipality decisions on whether to pass the funds on as bonuses and the basis upon which they allocated the funds between and within teams. Compared with England's P4P scheme, performance measurement under PMAQ focused more on structural rather than process quality of care, relied on many more indicators, and was less regular. While PMAQ represented an important new funding stream for primary health care, our review suggests that theoretical incentives generated were unclear and could have been better structured to direct health providers towards improvements in quality of care.
Keywords: Brazil; Financial incentives; Pay-for-performance; Primary health care.
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