Commons governance theory is central to identifying and managing conflicts arising from natural and cultural resources traps. Scholars - using game theory and economic analysis of law - have proposed alternative models, consisting of a set of mitigated scenarios, multiple players, and new equilibria in commons governance. Likewise, novel legal innovations of the commons have also been designed. Reinterpreting the commons in light of political economy, ecology, and pluralistic approaches, a critical review of existing scholarship, economic analysis of law, and case study investigations are performed. Examining an array of views - including governance of water in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Italy - a research and policy agenda is put forward to offer original interpretations and novel holistic perspectives. Germane environmental policy implications deriving from SDGs, resilient governance, and polycentric perspectives are thus extrapolated. Finally, pluralistic frameworks drafted by mitigation and adaptation are measured by improved sustainable development performance in commons, resource, and water governance.
Keywords: Common-pool resources; Cooperative game theory; Elinor ostrom; Regulation; Rodotà commission; Water governance.
© 2022. The Author(s).