Ingroup bias is often treated as the default outcome of intergroup comparisons. We argue that the mechanisms of impression formation depend on what information people infer from groups. We differentiate between belief-indicative groups that are more informative of beliefs and affect attitudes through ingroup bias and status-indicative groups that are more informative of status and affect attitudes through a preference for higher status. In a cross-cultural factorial experiment (Ntotal = 1,281), we demonstrate that when information about targets' multiple group memberships is available, belief-indicative groups affect attitudes via ingroup bias, whereas status-indicative groups-via preference for higher status. These effects were moderated by social-structural context. In two follow-up studies (Ntotal = 451), we develop and validate a measure of belief- and status-indicativeness (BISI) of groups. BISI showed expected correlations with related constructs of entitativity and essentialism. Belief-indicativeness of groups was a better predictor of ingroup bias than entitativity and essentialism.
Keywords: beliefs; ingroup bias; intersectional stereotyping; morality; status.