Low-carbon technology service mode with revenue-sharing contract considering advance funding risk

Abstract

This study aims to effectively reduce carbon emissions by selecting the low-carbon technology service emission reduction modes. This paper constructs a revenue-sharing contract model based on game theory. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the choice of carbon emission reduction strategies for carbon emission-dependent manufacturers and low-carbon technology service providers with advance funding risk aversion. This study analyzes the effects on the optimal decision-making and profits of both parties of the degree of risk aversion and the investment cost coefficient of carbon emissions reduction for service providers, and initial carbon emissions of manufacturers. The optimal carbon emissions reduction strategy of manufacturers and service providers with numerical analysis is obtained, and the revenue-sharing contract coordination is realized. Finally, the validity of the contract is verified by simulation analysis. The results show that manufacturers and service providers can only achieve optimal cooperation for emission reduction within a certain range of parameters. With different investment cost coefficients of carbon emissions reduction and with different initial carbon emissions, manufacturers will adjust the fixed emissions reduction fee and the revenue-sharing coefficient to encourage service providers to offer the optimal carbon emissions reduction rate. This study enriches theoretical research on low-carbon service chains. It also provides important practical evidence to help manufacturers and service providers choose optimal strategies for coordinating revenue-sharing contracts.

Keywords: Carbon emissions reduction; Carbon trading; Low-carbon service supply chains; Revenue-sharing contract; Risk aversion; Service mode.