Background: In December 2019, COVID-19 was first confirmed in Wuhan, China, and as the respiratory disease spread around the globe, there was a spike in interest worldwide in combating such contagious diseases. When such disasters occur, the central government of South Korea and its affiliated local governments-together with nongovernmental organizations-play a crucial role in crisis management systems.
Objective: The purpose of this paper is to corroborate the characteristics government ministries and domestic and foreign institutions exhibit through their interconnection when the parties are undergoing a disease-related catastrophe such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
Methods: Using the social network analysis technique, the span of the COVID-19 pandemic was segmented into 3 time frames, and the relational characteristics of the COVID-19 contagious disease response department and related agencies at home and abroad were analyzed based on 3 centralities.
Results: Evidence from the second and third time frames indicates that the agents reacting to contagious diseases do not necessarily hold the central position in the network. From this, it can be inferred that it is not only the primary host that plays a pivotal role but the key to a successful response to various disasters also lies in cooperation with the relevant parties.
Conclusions: The incongruency between the findings of this paper and the existing disaster response system gives rise to the corollary that both the essential parties and the adjoining ones need to collaborate for a coordinated crisis response in disaster situations. Furthermore, much significance lies in the fact that this paper explores the various aspects that could surface among the host and relevant parties in a real-life pandemic.
Keywords: COVID-19; contagious disease response; government departments’ networks; network structure; social network analysis.
©Jungyun Cho, Wook Kang, Julak Lee. Originally published in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance (https://publichealth.jmir.org), 23.05.2022.