Pain is Not a "thing": How That Error Affects Language and Logic in Pain Medicine

Abstract

Effectiveness in academic and clinical communication depends upon agreement on what words and concepts denote and on the consequent ability to argue logically and accurately. In the pain medicine literature there are many examples of imprecision and confusion in this respect, including misnomers and fallacies in reasoning. This article firstly critically examines some of these misnomers. Identified themes include pain being conceptualised as a "thing," conflation between nociception and pain, and confusion between stimulus and response and between the perspectives of the experiencer and the observer of "pain." Secondly, fallacies in reasoning are identified that contribute to imprecision and confusion. These include reification of pain, attributing to the brain functions that belong to whole organisms, and the illusory truth effect. Thirdly, these themes are identified also in constructs that are shown to be based more on speculation than on fact. Taken together, these observations reveal a need to review and, where necessary, modify terminology and concepts used in Pain Medicine. PERSPECTIVE: This article examines a number of words and constructs commonly found in the pain literature from the perspective of accuracy in terms of their consistency of usage, concordance with fact, degree of speculation and logical argument. A common major theme is the error of considering pain as a "thing" that has agentive properties. A need to clarify much of the language used in Pain Medicine is identified.

Keywords: Fallacies; Misnomers; Speculative concepts.