Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs

Abstract

We study the effect of variability in payoffs on the evolution of cooperation (C) against defection (D) in multi-player games in a finite well-mixed population. We show that an increase in the covariance between any two payoffs to D, or a decrease in the covariance between any two payoffs to C, increases the probability of ultimate fixation of C when represented once, and decreases the corresponding fixation probability for D. This is also the case with an increase in the covariance between any payoff to C and any payoff to D if and only if the sum of the numbers of C-players in the group associated with these payoffs is large enough compared to the group size. In classical social dilemmas with random cost and benefit for cooperation, the evolution of C is more likely to occur if the variances of the cost and benefit, as well as the group size, are small, while the covariance between cost and benefit is large.

Keywords: Moran model; Public goods game; Snowdrift game; Stag hunt game; Synergistic benefits.