As a promising next-generation network architecture, named data networking (NDN) supports name-based routing and in-network caching to retrieve content in an efficient, fast, and reliable manner. Most of the studies on NDN have proposed innovative and efficient caching mechanisms and retrieval of content via efficient routing. However, very few studies have targeted addressing the vulnerabilities in NDN architecture, which a malicious node can exploit to perform a content poisoning attack (CPA). This potentially results in polluting the in-network caches, the routing of content, and consequently isolates the legitimate content in the network. In the past, several efforts have been made to propose the mitigation strategies for the content poisoning attack, but to the best of our knowledge, no specific work has been done to address an emerging attack-surface in NDN, which we call an interest flooding attack. Handling this attack-surface can potentially make content poisoning attack mitigation schemes more effective, secure, and robust. Hence, in this article, we propose the addition of a security mechanism in the CPA mitigation scheme that is, Name-Key Based Forwarding and Multipath Forwarding Based Inband Probe, in which we block the malicious face of compromised consumers by monitoring the Cache-Miss Ratio values and the Queue Capacity at the Edge Routers. The malicious face is blocked when the cache-miss ratio hits the threshold value, which is adjusted dynamically through monitoring the cache-miss ratio and queue capacity values. The experimental results show that we are successful in mitigating the vulnerability of the CPA mitigation scheme by detecting and blocking the flooding interface, at the cost of very little verification overhead at the NDN Routers.
Keywords: Content poisoning attacks; Dynamic threshold; Malicious consumer interest packet; Mitigation techniques; Named data networking.
© 2021 Qureshi et al.