In 2005, a chikungunya virus outbreak devastated the tropical island of Reunion, infecting a third of the total population. Motivated by the Reunion Island case study, we investigate the theoretic potential for two intervention measures under both voluntary and mandatory protocols to control a vector-borne disease when there is risk of the disease becoming endemic. The first measure uses insect repellent to prevent mosquito bites, while the second involves emigrating to the neighboring Mauritius Island to avoid infection. There is a threshold on the cost of using repellent above which both voluntary and mandatory regimes find it optimal to forgo usage. Below that threshold, mandatory usage protocols will eradicate the disease; however, voluntary adoption leaves the disease at a small endemic level. Emigrating from the island to avoid infection results in a tragedy-of-the-commons effect: while being potentially beneficial to specific susceptible individuals, the remaining islanders paradoxically face a higher risk of infection. Mandated relocation of susceptible individuals away from the epidemic is viable only if the cost of this relocation is several magnitudes lower than the cost of infection. Since this assumption is unlikely to hold for chikungunya, it is optimal to discourage such emigration for the benefit of the entire population. An underlying assumption about the conservation of human-vector encounter rates in mosquito biting behavior informs our conclusions and may warrant additional experimental verification.
Keywords: Chikungunya; Epidemiology; Game theory; Herd immunity; Nash equilibrium; Reunion Island.
©2020 Klein et al.