Strategic Self-Regulation in Groups: Collective Implementation Intentions Help Cooperate When Cooperation Is Called for

J Lukas Thürmer; Frank Wieber; Peter M Gollwitzer

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.561388

Strategic Self-Regulation in Groups: Collective Implementation Intentions Help Cooperate When Cooperation Is Called for

Front Psychol. 2020 Nov 24:11:561388. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.561388. eCollection 2020.

Authors

J Lukas Thürmer^{1

2}, Frank Wieber^{1

3}, Peter M Gollwitzer^{1

4

5}

Affiliations

¹ Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany.
² Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria.
³ Institute of Health Sciences, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Zurich, Switzerland.
⁴ Department of Psychology, New York University, New York City, NY, United States.
⁵ Institute of Psychology, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany.

Abstract

Groups need contributions that are personally costly to their members. Such cooperation is only adaptive when others cooperate as well, as unconditional cooperation may incur high costs to the individual. We argue that individuals can use We-if-then plans (collective implementation intentions, cIIs) to regulate their group-directed behavior strategically, helping them to cooperate selectively with group members in the situation planned for. In line with this prediction, a cII to consider group earnings increased cooperative decisions in a prisoners' dilemma game when playing against another group member but not when playing against a stranger (i.e., non-group member). Moreover, cIIs to cooperate in the prisoners' dilemma game did not increase cooperation in a structurally similar investment game that participants had not planned for. We discuss the role of collective planning in solving social dilemmas.

Keywords: collective implementation intentions; cooperation; motivation science; prisoners’ dilemma; self-regulation; small group performance.