A game-theoretic model of Monkeypox to assess vaccination strategies

Sri Vibhaav Bankuru; Samuel Kossol; William Hou; Parsa Mahmoudi; Jan Rychtář; Dewey Taylor

doi:10.7717/peerj.9272

A game-theoretic model of Monkeypox to assess vaccination strategies

PeerJ. 2020 Jun 22:8:e9272. doi: 10.7717/peerj.9272. eCollection 2020.

Authors

Sri Vibhaav Bankuru¹, Samuel Kossol¹, William Hou², Parsa Mahmoudi³, Jan Rychtář⁴, Dewey Taylor⁴

Affiliations

¹ Department of Biomedical Engineering, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, United States of America.
² Department of Kinesiology and Health Sciences, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, United States of America.
³ Department of Biology, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, United States of America.
⁴ Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, United States of America.

Abstract

Monkeypox (MPX) is a zoonotic disease similar to smallpox. Its fatality rate is about 11% and it is endemic to the Central and West African countries. In this paper, we analyze a compartmental model of MPX dynamics. Our goal is to see whether MPX can be controlled and eradicated by voluntary vaccinations. We show that there are three equilibria-disease free, fully endemic and previously neglected semi-endemic (with disease existing only among humans). The existence of semi-endemic equilibrium has severe implications should the MPX virus mutate to increased viral fitness in humans. We find that MPX is controllable and can be eradicated in a semi-endemic equilibrium by vaccination. However, in a fully endemic equilibrium, MPX cannot be eradicated by vaccination alone.

Keywords: Game theory; Monkeypox; Nash equilibrium; Smallpox; Vaccination.

Grants and funding

Support for publishing this article was provided by the VCU Libraries Open Access Publishing Fund. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.