Corlett, P. R. (2019. Factor one, familiarity and frontal cortex: A challenge to the two-factor theory of delusions. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 24(3), 165-177. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1606706 ) raises two groups of challenges against the two-factor theory of delusions: One focuses on weighing "the evidence for … the two-factor theory"; the other aims to question "the logic of the two-factor theory" (ibid., p. 166). McKay, R. (2019. Measles, magic and misidentifications: A defence of the two-factor theory of delusions. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 24(3), 183-190. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1607273 ) has robustly defended the two-factor theory against the first group. But the second group, which Corlett believes is in many aspects independent of the first group and Darby, R. R. (2019. A network-based response to the two-factor theory of delusion formation. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 24(3), 178-182. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1606709 , p. 180) takes as "[t]he most important challenge to the two-factor theory raised by Dr. Corlett", has by large remained. Here I offer my two cents in response to the second group. More specifically, I argue that Corlett's challenges to the logic of the two-factor theory, concerning modularity, double dissociation and cognitive penetration, seem to be based on some misunderstandings of the two-factor theory.
Keywords: Delusions; cognitive penetration; double dissociation; modularity; two-factor theory.