According to the social heuristics hypothesis, people intuitively cooperate or defect depending on which behavior is beneficial in their interactions. If cooperation is beneficial, people intuitively cooperate, but if defection is beneficial, they intuitively defect. However, deliberation promotes defection. Here, we tested two novel predictions regarding the role of trust in the social heuristics hypothesis. First, whether trust promotes intuitive cooperation. Second, whether preferring to think intuitively or deliberatively moderates the effect of trust on cooperation. In addition, we examined whether deciding intuitively promotes cooperation, compared to deciding deliberatively. To evaluate these predictions, we conducted a lab study in Colombia and an online study in the United Kingdom (N = 1,066; one study was pre-registered). Unexpectedly, higher trust failed to promote intuitive cooperation, though higher trust promoted cooperation. In addition, preferring to think intuitively or deliberatively failed to moderate the effect of trust on cooperation, although preferring to think intuitively increased cooperation. Moreover, deciding intuitively failed to promote cooperation, and equivalence testing confirmed that this null result was explained by the absence of an effect, rather than a lack of statistical power (equivalence bounds: d = -0.26 and 0.26). An intuitive cooperation effect emerged when non-compliant participants were excluded, but this effect could be due to selection biases. Taken together, most results failed to support the social heuristics hypothesis. We conclude by discussing implications, future directions, and limitations. The materials, data, and code are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/939jv/).