Reductionism in retreat

Behav Brain Sci. 2019 Jan:42:e32. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X18002091.

Abstract

We address the commentaries on our target article in terms of four major themes. First, we note that virtually all commentators agree that mental disorders are not brain disorders in the common interpretation of these terms, and establish the consensus that explanatory reductionism is not a viable thesis. Second, we address criticisms to the effect that our article was misdirected or aimed at a straw man; we argue that this is unlikely, given the widespread communication of reductionist slogans in psychopathology research and society. Third, we tackle the question of whether intentionality, extended systems, and multiple realizability are as problematic as claimed in the target article, and we present a number of nuances and extensions with respect to our article. Fourth, we discuss the question of how the network approach should incorporate biological factors, given that wholesale reductionism is an unlikely option.

Publication types

  • Comment

MeSH terms

  • Animals
  • Mental Disorders*
  • Models, Animal
  • Psychopathology
  • Research*