Conditionals and inferential connections: A hypothetical inferential theory

Cogn Psychol. 2018 Mar:101:50-81. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.09.002. Epub 2018 Jan 9.

Abstract

Intuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind of connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new psychological theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and psychological theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven, satisficing-bounded inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test our theory, we created a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were presented with a soritical series of objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and spheres (Experiment 2), or both (Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related conditionals embodying non-causal inferential connections (such as "If patch number 5 is blue, then so is patch number 4"). All four experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in which (largely determinate) responses were sensitive to parameters determining inference strength, as well as to consequent position in the series, in a way analogous to belief bias. Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can be suppressed, with participants reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that this pattern can be partly explained by a measure of inference strength. This pattern supports our theory's "principle of relevant inference" and "principle of bounded inference," highlighting the dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.

Keywords: Belief bias; Conditionals; Dual processing; Inferential semantics; Relevance; Satisficing.

MeSH terms

  • Female
  • Humans
  • Judgment*
  • Logic*
  • Male
  • Models, Statistical
  • Problem Solving / physiology*