Social cooperation often requires collectively beneficial but individually costly restraint to maintain a public good1-4, or it needs costly generosity to create one1,5. Status quo effects6 predict that maintaining a public good is easier than providing a new one. Here we show experimentally and with simulations that even under identical incentives, low levels of cooperation (the 'tragedy of the commons'2) are systematically more likely in Maintenance than Provision. Across three series of experiments, we find that strong and weak positive reciprocity, known to be fundamental tendencies underpinning human cooperation7-10, are substantially diminished under Maintenance compared to Provision. As we show in a fourth experiment, the opposite holds for negative reciprocity ('punishment'). Our findings suggest that incentives to avoid the 'tragedy of the commons' need to contend with dilemma-specific reciprocity.
Keywords: Tragedy of the Commons; evolution of human cooperation; public goods; strong and weak reciprocity.