This article tries to assess the potentials and limits of neuroethics. It argues that neuroscience and ethics should collaborate each other with mutual respect and preservation of their respective identities, scientific in the first case and philosophical in the second one ( neuroethics as cooperation). The text develops also a criticism in front of any attempt to replace the philosophical ethics by the neurosciences ( neuroethics as substitution). Consequently, the most appropriate ontological and anthropological foundations are explored to develop a cooperative neuroethics. These foundations refer to the Aristotelian hylomorphic conception of the substances. On such foundations it is possible to develop a collaborative neuroethics which includes two aspects: on the one hand, we have an ethics of neuroscience and, on the other one, a neuroscience of ethics. The first one shows us how to conduct neuroscience while preserving human dignity. The second one teaches us about the neurobiological basis of our moral agency. These bases enable our moral behavior without determining it. By studying them our vulnerability as moral agents emerges as evidence. This vulnerability, which is rooted in the very human nature, must be, as it is argued along the last pages of the text, recognized as well as mitigated.