Antibiotic resistance is a collective action dilemma. Individuals may request antibiotics, but an overall reduction in use is necessary to limit resistance. A reoccurring theoretical claim is that social capital increase cooperation in social dilemmas. The aim of this paper is to investigate the link between generalized trust and reciprocity and the willingness to postpone antibiotic treatment in order to limit overuse in a scenario-based study. A between-subject scenario experimental approach with hypothetical scenarios was utilized. Participants were asked to imagine that they were seeing a doctor for a respiratory infection. The doctor prescribes antibiotics, but advise postponing therapy to see if the disease resolves by itself, for the sake of limiting overuse. Respondents were asked to answer how long they could accept postponing antibiotic treatment, from 0 to 7 days. The number of days that most people would be able to accept postponing treatment was considered the between-subject factor. In total, the study sample included 981 respondents with a mean age of 51 years. A majority of respondents were men (65.7%). The mean number of days that the respondents stated they were willing to postpone antibiotic treatment was positively associated with the number of days the respondents were told that most people were willing to postpone antibiotic treatment, p < 0.001. There was a positive association between number of days they were willing to postpone antibiotic treatment and generalized trust, p = 0.001. In conclusion, the results showed that the proclaimed public willingness to postpone therapy influenced a respondent's willingness to postpone antibiotic therapy in different scenarios. Also, generalized trust was positively associated with the willingness to postpone therapy.
Keywords: Antibiotic resistance; Collective action; Reciprocity; Scenario experiment; Sweden; Trust.
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