The truth about lying

Angelo Turri; John Turri

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.007

The truth about lying

Cognition. 2015 May:138:161-8. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.007. Epub 2015 Mar 13.

Authors

Angelo Turri¹, John Turri²

Affiliations

¹ Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario N2L3G1, Canada. Electronic address: angelo.turri@gmail.com.
² Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario N2L3G1, Canada. Electronic address: john.turri@gmail.com.

PMID: 25754242
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.007

Abstract

The standard view in social science and philosophy is that lying does not require the liar's assertion to be false, only that the liar believes it to be false. We conducted three experiments to test whether lying requires falsity. Overall, the results suggest that it does. We discuss some implications for social scientists working on social judgments, research on lie detection, and public moral discourse.

Keywords: Deception; Lying; Social cognition.

Publication types

Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

Adolescent
Adult
Aged
Culture*
Deception*
Female
Humans
Judgment
Lie Detection
Male
Middle Aged
Morals
Social Perception
Young Adult