This paper presents a compact synthesis of the study of cognition in legal decisionmaking. Featured dynamics include the story-telling model (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), lay prototypes (Smith, 1991), motivated cognition (Sood, 2012), and coherence-based reasoning (Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001). Unlike biases and heuristics understood to bound or constrain rationality, these dynamics identify how information shapes a variety of cognitive inputs-from prior beliefs to perceptions of events to the probative weight assigned new information-that rational decisionmaking presupposes. The operation of these mechanisms can be shown to radically alter the significance that jurors give to evidence, and hence the conclusions they reach, within a Bayesian framework of information processing. How these dynamics interact with the professional judgment of lawyers and judges, the paper notes, remains in need of investigation.
Keywords: Legal decisionmaking; Motivated cognition; Story telling model.
Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.