We tested the influence of causal links on the production of memory errors in a misinformation paradigm. Participants studied a set of statements about a person, which were presented as either individual statements or pairs of causally linked statements. Participants were then provided with causally plausible and causally implausible misinformation. We hypothesised that studying information connected with causal links would promote representing information in a more abstract manner. As such, we predicted that causal information would not provide an overall protection against memory errors, but rather would preferentially help in the rejection of misinformation that was causally implausible, given the learned causal links. In two experiments, we measured whether the causal linkage of information would be generally protective against all memory errors or only selectively protective against certain types of memory errors. Causal links helped participants reject implausible memory lures, but did not protect against plausible lures. Our results suggest that causal information may promote an abstract storage of information that helps prevent only specific types of memory errors.
Keywords: Causal memory; Causality; False memory; Memory errors; Misinformation.