Problem solving is sometimes accompanied by a sudden feeling of knowing, or insight. The specific cognitive processes that underlie insightful problem solving are a matter of great interest and debate. Although some investigators favor a special-process view, which explains insight in terms of specialized mechanisms that operate outside of conscious awareness, others favor a business-as-usual account, which posits that insightful problem solving involves the same conscious mechanisms-including working memory (WM) and attention-that are implicated in noninsightful problem solving. In the present study, we used an individual-differences approach to explore the contributions of WM and attention to the solution of compound remote associate (CRA) problems. On the basis of self-report insight ratings, we identified CRA problems whose solution was accompanied by a subjective feeling of insight and examined the correlations between problem performance and measures of WM capacity (verbal and spatial) and attention control (Stroop and antisaccade tasks). The results indicated that individual differences in verbal WM and attention significantly explained variation in overall CRA problem solving and, most importantly, in the occurrence of solutions that were accompanied by a feeling of insight. The findings implicated both modality-dependent WM mechanisms and modality-independent attention control mechanisms in this class of insight problems. Comparisons of the accuracy and solution-latency findings for insightfully versus noninsightfully solved CRA problems, and for participants working silently versus in a "think-aloud" condition, provided additional evidence against the special-process view, and reinforcing the business-as-usual account of insight.