Artificial distinction and real discrimination

Elena Inarra; Annick Laruelle

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.034

Artificial distinction and real discrimination

J Theor Biol. 2012 Jul 21:305:110-7. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.034. Epub 2012 Apr 5.

Authors

Elena Inarra¹, Annick Laruelle

Affiliation

¹ BRiDGE, Foundations of Economic Analysis I, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), E-48015 Bilbao, Spain. elena.inarra@ehu.es

PMID: 22498802
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.034

Abstract

In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.

Publication types

Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

Aggression
Animals
Behavior, Animal
Biological Evolution*
Competitive Behavior
Game Theory*
Models, Genetic*
Poultry