Ecology may indeed be 'deep', as some have maintained, but perhaps much of the mystery surrounding it owes more simply to the dissonance between ecological notions and the fundamentals of the modern synthesis. Comparison of the axioms supporting the Newtonian world view with those underlying the organicist and stochastic metaphors that motivate much of ecosystems science reveals strong disagreements--especially regarding the nature of the causes of events and the scalar domains over which these causes can operate. The late Karl Popper held that the causal closure forced by our mechanical perspective on nature frustrates our attempts to achieve an 'evolutionary theory of knowledge.' He suggested that the Newtonian concept of 'force' must be generalized to encompass the contingencies that arise in evolutionary processes. His reformulation of force as 'propensity' leads quite naturally to a generalization of Newton's laws for ecology. The revised tenets appear, however, to exhibit more scope and allow for change to arise from within a system. Although Newton's laws survive (albeit in altered form) within a coalescing ecological metaphysic, the axioms that Enlightenment thinkers appended to Newton's work seem ill-suited for ecology and perhaps should yield to a new and coherent set of assumptions on how to view the processes of nature.