"It's Not Literally True, But You Get the Gist:" How nuanced understandings of truth encourage people to condone and spread misinformation

Julia A Langdon; Beth Anne Helgason; Judy Qiu; Daniel A Effron

doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101788

"It's Not Literally True, But You Get the Gist:" How nuanced understandings of truth encourage people to condone and spread misinformation

Curr Opin Psychol. 2024 Jan 13:57:101788. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101788. Online ahead of print.

Authors

Julia A Langdon¹, Beth Anne Helgason², Judy Qiu², Daniel A Effron²

Affiliations

¹ Organisational Behaviour Subject Area, London Business School, Regent's Park, UK. Electronic address: julia.langdon@esmt.org.
² Organisational Behaviour Subject Area, London Business School, Regent's Park, UK.

PMID: 38306926
DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101788

Abstract

People have a more-nuanced view of misinformation than the binary distinction between "fake news" and "real news" implies. We distinguish between the truth of a statement's verbatim details (i.e., the specific, literal information) and its gist (i.e., the general, overarching meaning), and suggest that people tolerate and intentionally spread misinformation in part because they believe its gist. That is, even when they recognize a claim as literally false, they may judge it as morally acceptable to spread because they believe it is true "in spirit." Prior knowledge, partisanship, and imagination increase belief in the gist. We argue that partisan conflict about the morality of spreading misinformation hinges on disagreements not only about facts but also about gists.

Keywords: Fake news; Fuzzy-trace theory; Gist; Misinformation; Morality; Partisan politics; Verbatim.

Publication types

Review