Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons

Sebastian Schmidt

doi:10.1007/s44204-023-00103-0

Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons

Asian J Philos. 2023;2(2):50. doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00103-0. Epub 2023 Sep 21.

Author

Sebastian Schmidt^{1

2}

Affiliations

¹ Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
² African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Abstract

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt's cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework.

Keywords: Evidence; Incoherence; Reasons-first; Suspending judgment.