When studying social dilemma games, a crucial question arises regarding the impact of general heterogeneity on cooperation, which has been shown to have positive effects in numerous studies. Here, we demonstrate that heterogeneity in the contribution value for the focal public goods game can jeopardize cooperation. We show that there is an optimal contribution value in the homogeneous case that most benefits cooperation depending on the lattice. In a heterogeneous scenario, where strategy and contribution coevolve, cooperators making contributions higher than the optimal value end up harming those who contribute less. This effect is notably detrimental to cooperation in the square lattice with von Neumann neighborhood, while it can have no impact in other lattices. Furthermore, in parameter regions where a higher-contributing cooperator cannot normally survive alone, the exploitation of lower-value contribution cooperators allows their survival, resembling a parasitic behavior. To obtain these results, we examined the effect of various distributions for the contribution values in the initial condition and we conducted Monte Carlo simulations.