Incentives for promoting climate change adaptation technologies in agriculture: an evolutionary game approach

Abstract

Climate change adaptation technologies (CCATs) have become increasingly important for farmers as they face the challenges of climate change and natural disasters. Despite this, many rural areas still rely on traditional agricultural techniques. To promote the adoption of CCATs in agriculture, it is necessary to explore the incentives and conditions for the effectiveness of the policy. We develop an evolutionary game model to analyze the behavior of local governments and farmers in promoting CCATs. Our findings indicate that, under certain conditions, the promotion of CCATs can achieve equilibrium. The incentive for farmers to adopt CCATs increases within a certain range when local governments provide risk subsidies and cost sharing. When subsidies are too high, however, local governments may choose not to promote CCATs, which reduces the incentives for farmers to adopt them. Publicity is also an important factor in promoting CCATs. Our study provides insight into the development of policies aimed at promoting CCATs in agriculture.

Keywords: Agriculture; Climate change adaptation; Evolutionary games; Incentives; Technology promotion.