Promoting climate actions: A cognitive-constraints approach

Abstract

The present paper reports an experiment with a two-year-delayed (M = 695 days) follow-up that tests an approach to raising willingness to take political and personal climate actions. Many Americans still do not view climate change as a threat requiring urgent action. Moreover, among American conservatives, higher science literacy is paradoxically associated with higher anthropogenic climate-change skepticism. Our experimental materials were designed to harness the power of two central cognitive constraints - coherence and causal invariance, which map onto two narrative proclivities that anthropologists have identified as universal - to promote climate action across the political spectrum. Towards that goal, the essential role of these constraints in the causal-belief-formation process predicts that climate-change information would be more persuasive when it is embedded in a personal climate-action narrative, the evocation of which can benefit from exposure to parsimonious scientific explanations of indisputable everyday observations, juxtaposed with reasoners' own, typically less coherent explanations, occurring in a context that engages their moral stance. Our brief one-time intervention, conducted in ten U.S. states with the highest level of climate skepticism, showed that across the political spectrum, our materials raised appreciation of science, openness to alternative views, and willingness to take climate actions in the immediate assessment. It also raised how likely were reports two years later of having taken those actions or would have taken them had the opportunity existed, suggesting a long-lasting effect. Our approach adopts the framework that conceptions of reality are representations, and adaptive solutions in that infinite space of representations require cognitive constraints to narrow the search.

Keywords: Belief revision; Causal invariance; Climate change; Coherence; Science communication.