Supporters of opt-in organ procurement policies typically claim that the absence of consent to postmortem transplantable organ retrieval is a normative barrier to such retrieval. On this ground, justification of opt-out policies is demanded. The paper shows that postmortem organ retrieval is normatively different from live organ removal, and so the doctrine of informed consent does not apply to it in the way it does in other types of cases. First, seen as the instrument of protection of autonomy or the right to self-determination, informed consent cannot be relied on in the case of dead persons; secondly, viewed as an instrument of annulment of harm or wrong to the dead (volenti non fit injuria), informed consent relies on indefensible accounts of posthumous harm or wrong. Postmortem organ retrieval in cases of absence of the decedent's consent and refusal is governed by other norms than those related to consent. Such norms include, among others, respectful treatment of human remains (such as those found in regulations of medicine, law enforcement, and research) and avoidance of inherently wrong contexts and purposes (such as killing for the purpose of organ retrieval or trade in the human body or its parts). It is concluded that the onus probandi is on the supporters of opt-in, rather than opt-out, policies of posthumous organ retrieval.
Keywords: informed consent; opt-in; opt-out; organ procurement; organ transplantation; posthumous harm.
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