Exploring vaccination behavior is fundamental to understand the role of vaccine in suppressing the epidemic. Motivated by the efficient role of the risk perception and the subsidy policy in promoting vaccination, we propose the Risk Perception and the Risk Perception with Subsidy Policy voluntary vaccination strategies with imperfect vaccine. The risk perception is driven by multiple information sources based on global information (released by Public Health Bureau) and local information (from first-order neighbors). In time-varying networks, we use the mean-field approach and the Monte Carlo simulations to analyze the epidemic dynamics under vaccination behavior with imperfect vaccine. We find that vaccination with the incorporation of risk perception and subsidy policy can effectively control the epidemic. Moreover, information from different sources plays different roles. Global information is more helpful in promoting vaccination than local information. In addition, to further understand the influence of vaccination strategies, we calculate the social cost as the cost for the vaccine and treatment, and find that excess vaccination cost results in a higher social cost after the herd immunity. Thus, for balancing the epidemic control and social cost, providing individuals with more global information as well as local information would be helpful in vaccination. These results are expected to provide insightful guidance for designing the policy to promote vaccination.