Coinfection is the process of an infection of a single host with two or more pathogen variants or with two or more distinct pathogen species, which often threatens public health and the stability of economies. In this paper, we propose a novel two-strain epidemic model characterizing the co-evolution of coinfection and voluntary vaccination strategies. In the framework of evolutionary vaccination, we design two game rules, the individual-based risk assessment (IB-RA) updated rule, and the strategy-based risk assessment (SB-RA) updated rule, to update the vaccination policy. Through detailed numerical analysis, we find that increasing the vaccine effectiveness and decreasing the transmission rate effectively suppress the disease prevalence, and moreover, the outcome of the SB-RA updated rule is more encouraging than those results of the IB-RA rule for curbing the disease transmission. Coinfection complicates the effects of the transmission rate of each strain on the final epidemic sizes.
Keywords: co-infection; evolutionary game theory; imperfect vaccination.