Detecting and Localizing Cyber-Physical Attacks in Water Distribution Systems without Records of Labeled Attacks

Sensors (Basel). 2022 Aug 12;22(16):6035. doi: 10.3390/s22166035.

Abstract

Modern water distribution systems (WDSs) offer automated controls and operations to improve their efficiency and reliability. Nonetheless, such automation can be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Therefore, various approaches have been suggested to detect cyber-attacks in WDSs. However, most of these approaches rely on labeled attack records which are rarely available in real-world applications. Thus, for a detection model to be practical, it should be able to detect and localize events without referring to a predetermined list of labeled attacks. This study proposes a semi-supervised approach that relies solely on attack-free datasets to address this challenge. The approach utilizes a reduction in dimensionality by using maximum canonical correlation analysis (MCCA) followed by support vector data description (SVDD). The developed algorithm was tested on two case studies and various datasets, demonstrating consistently high performance in detecting and localizing cyber-attacks.

Keywords: cyber security of water systems; smart water systems; water cyber-physical systems.

MeSH terms

  • Algorithms
  • Computer Security*
  • Reproducibility of Results
  • Water*

Substances

  • Water

Grants and funding

This research was funded by the Technion Hiroshi Fujiwara Cyber Security Research Center and the Israel National Cyber Directorate. The first authors is also supported by the Israeli Water Authority grant #4501683698.