Promotion incentives and air pollution: From the political promotion tournament to the environment tournament

Abstract

Chinese officials play an important role in air pollution control. This paper used a sample of 282 prefecture-level cities in China to discuss the impact of promotion incentives of officials on air pollution from the perspectives of heterogeneity, mechanism and spatial effects. We found that the promotion incentives of officials reduced air pollution, and GDP per capita had positive moderating effects. The effects of promotion incentives were more significant in cities with less air pollution, in the central and western regions, for officials with higher education levels, or years after 2007. The promotion incentives could promote the development of green finance and green technology innovation, both of which were conducive to mitigating air pollution. Using the dynamic spatial Durbin model (DSDM), we found that the promotion incentives had negative spatial spillover effects. The promotion incentives in surrounding cities reduced air pollution in the local city; however, it had only short-run effects and no long-run effects.

Keywords: Air pollution; Dynamic spatial durbin model; Green finance; Green technology innovation; Promotion incentives of officials.