Evolutionary game analysis of coal enterprise resource integration under government regulation

Abstract

Resource integration of coal enterprises is conducive to reducing pollution and carbon emissions, thus alleviating environmental problems such as global warming. Government regulation has a great influence on enterprise behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the strategies of government and coal enterprises in resource integration. Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. In addition, this paper further analyzes the impact of different government policies on coal enterprises' green innovation strategies. Results demonstrate that (1) when the power gap between enterprises is large, the probability of dominant enterprises choosing resource integration converges to 1, while the probability of inferior enterprises converges to 0. Therefore, government regulations are invalid for inferior enterprises; (2) the combination of government regulations can help improve the efficiency of coal enterprises' strategic choices. With the increase in the intensity of government rewards and punishments, the probability of enterprise resource integration evolves from 0 to 1; (3) excessive government regulations make the choice between the government and coal companies tend to swing, because the probability of the two is between 0 and 1. Therefore, excessive government regulations cannot effectively achieve resource integration and government regulation. (4) The government subsidy strategy is less effective than the government's pollution penalty strategy in promoting the green innovation of enterprises. Our research shows that the government should choose different policy combinations and intensities to regulate resource integration according to the market power of coal enterprises, which provides theoretical reference and practical guidance for the government to regulate corporate resource integration behavior.

Keywords: Enterprise resource integration; Evolutionary game;; Market power;; Pollution penalties;; Strategic choice; Tax incentives;.