Psychological theories posit that affective experiences can be decomposed into component constituents, yet disagree on the level of representation of these components. Affective experiences have been previously described as emerging from core dimensions of valence and arousal. However, this view needs to be reconciled with accounts of valence processing in appetitive and aversive circuits from the neuroscience literature. Here we offer an account of affect that allows for both perspectives but compares across levels of analysis. At one level of analysis, valence and arousal are observed already in the properties of encountered stimuli and the appetitive and aversive neural circuits that engage accordingly. At another level of analysis, the explicit experiential aspect of affective processes are compressed and appraised in a manner that allows these experiences to be organized along valence and arousal axes. We review both the behavioral neuroscience evidence on appetitive and aversive circuits as well as the cognitive neuroscience literature on compression in information coding across multiple domains of processing. We argue that these processes are domain-general and adapt these principles to provide a perspective on how valence can be represented at multiple scales in the brain.
Keywords: Affect; appetitive; aversive; compression; valence.