An evolutionary game analysis of governments' decision-making behaviors and factors influencing watershed ecological compensation in China

Xin Gao; Juqin Shen; Weijun He; Fuhua Sun; Zhaofang Zhang; Weijian Guo; Xin Zhang; Yang Kong

doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109592

An evolutionary game analysis of governments' decision-making behaviors and factors influencing watershed ecological compensation in China

J Environ Manage. 2019 Dec 1:251:109592. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109592. Epub 2019 Sep 27.

Authors

Xin Gao¹, Juqin Shen², Weijun He³, Fuhua Sun⁴, Zhaofang Zhang⁵, Weijian Guo⁶, Xin Zhang⁷, Yang Kong⁸

Affiliations

¹ Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China. Electronic address: gxtz1987@hhu.edu.cn.
² Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China; College of Agricultural Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China. Electronic address: jqshen@hhu.edu.cn.
³ College of Economics & Management, China Three Gorges University, Yichang, 443002, China. Electronic address: weijunhe@ctgu.edu.cn.
⁴ Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China; College of Agricultural Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China. Electronic address: fhsun@hhu.edu.cn.
⁵ Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China. Electronic address: zackzhang@hhu.edu.cn.
⁶ Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China. Electronic address: winchellguo@hhu.edu.cn.
⁷ International Economic &Technical Cooperation and Exchange Center, Ministry of Water Resources, Beijing, 100038, China. Electronic address: zhangxin@mwr.gov.cn.
⁸ Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China. Electronic address: yangkong@hhu.edu.cn.

PMID: 31569022
DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109592

Abstract

As a way to coordinate the interests of multi-government and solve the problem of transboundary water pollution, watershed ecological compensation system has been promoted in China. It is necessary to understand the influencing factors of watershed ecological compensation from the perspective of how interactions occur between different governments. This paper analyses the interaction among upstream governments, downstream governments and the central government in the Eastern Route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project, using evolutionary game theory. In particular, how ecological benefits are distributed between upstream and downstream governments is analyzed. Simultaneously, numerical simulation is used to analyze the effects of influencing factors on governments' behaviors. The results show that: (1) the initial willingness of governments to corporate affect their final behaviors; (2) upstream and downstream governments cannot spontaneously cooperate to implement watershed ecological compensation system without supervision of the central government; (3) opportunity costs only have a significant impact on upstream governments; (4) punishment on downstream governments can effectively influence the behaviors of governments at all levels; (5) high ecological compensation fee improve downstream governments' willness not to pay; (6) upstream governments get about 78% of ecological benefits due to the implementation of watershed ecological compensation system.

Keywords: Eastern route; Evolutionary game theory; South-to-North water transfer project; Transboundary water pollution; Watershed ecological compensation.

MeSH terms

China
Ecology*
Ecosystem
Game Theory
Government*