Stackelberg game of buyback policy in supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-averse supplier based on CVaR

PLoS One. 2014 Sep 23;9(9):e104576. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0104576. eCollection 2014.

Abstract

This paper considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single supplier sells a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. We assume that the supplier and the retailer are both risk averse and utilize Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), a risk measure method which is popularized in financial risk management, to estimate their risk attitude. We establish a buyback policy model based on Stackelberg game theory under considering supply chain members' risk preference and get the expressions of the supplier's optimal repurchase price and the retailer's optimal order quantity which are compared with those under risk neutral case. Finally, a numerical example is applied to simulate that model and prove related conclusions.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

  • Economics*
  • Financial Management
  • Models, Theoretical

Grants and funding

This paper was supported by Nation Natural Science Foundation of China 71221006, 71171201, 71371194, 71171202, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central South University 2011RWSK003 & 2011JQ025. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.