How do people represent object meaning? It is now uncontentious that thinking about manipulable objects (e.g., pencils) activates brain regions underlying action. But is this activation part of the meaning of these objects, or is it merely incidental? The research we report here shows that when the hands are engaged in a task involving motions that are incompatible with those used to interact with frequently manipulated objects, it is more difficult to think about those objects--but not harder to think about infrequently manipulated objects (e.g., bookcases). Critically, the amount of manual experience with the object determines the amount of interference. These findings show that brain activity underlying manual action is part of, not peripheral to, the representation of frequently manipulated objects. Further, they suggest that people's ability to think about an object changes dynamically on the basis of the match between their (experience-based) mental representation of its meaning and whatever they are doing at that moment.
Keywords: action concepts; cognition; cognitive neuroscience; embodied cognition; individual experience; language; meaning; semantic memory; semantic representations; simulation.