Consciousness: the radical plasticity thesis

Prog Brain Res. 2008:168:19-33. doi: 10.1016/S0079-6123(07)68003-0.

Abstract

In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends in a graded manner on properties such as its stability in time or its strength. Crucially, these properties are accrued as a result of learning, which is in turn viewed as a mandatory process that always accompanies information processing. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum defined over "quality of representation", such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with quality, and (2) the implication of systems of metarepresentations. A first implication of these ideas is that the main function of consciousness is to make flexible, adaptive control over behavior possible. A second, much more speculative implication, is that we learn to be conscious. This I call the "radical plasticity thesis"--the hypothesis that consciousness emerges in systems capable not only of learning about their environment, but also about their own internal representations of it.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
  • Review

MeSH terms

  • Consciousness*
  • Humans
  • Learning
  • Models, Biological*
  • Nerve Net / physiology*
  • Neuronal Plasticity / physiology*