Syndromic surveillance and bioterrorism-related epidemics

Emerg Infect Dis. 2003 Oct;9(10):1197-204. doi: 10.3201/eid0910.030231.

Abstract

To facilitate rapid detection of a future bioterrorist attack, an increasing number of public health departments are investing in new surveillance systems that target the early manifestations of bioterrorism-related disease. Whether this approach is likely to detect an epidemic sooner than reporting by alert clinicians remains unknown. The detection of a bioterrorism-related epidemic will depend on population characteristics, availability and use of health services, the nature of an attack, epidemiologic features of individual diseases, surveillance methods, and the capacity of health departments to respond to alerts. Predicting how these factors will combine in a bioterrorism attack may be impossible. Nevertheless, understanding their likely effect on epidemic detection should help define the usefulness of syndromic surveillance and identify approaches to increasing the likelihood that clinicians recognize and report an epidemic.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
  • Review

MeSH terms

  • Anthrax / diagnosis
  • Anthrax / epidemiology
  • Bioterrorism*
  • Botulism / diagnosis
  • Botulism / epidemiology
  • Disease Outbreaks*
  • Hemorrhagic Fevers, Viral / diagnosis
  • Hemorrhagic Fevers, Viral / epidemiology
  • Humans
  • Plague / diagnosis
  • Plague / epidemiology
  • Population Surveillance / methods*
  • Seasons
  • Smallpox / diagnosis
  • Smallpox / epidemiology
  • Syndrome
  • Tularemia / diagnosis
  • Tularemia / epidemiology