The concept of guardianship, its associated principles, distinctions, and articulation of the legal needs of the elderly are introduced via a review of well-canvassed criticisms of Canadian guardianship legislation. Claims that the reformed legislation of Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia represent models of adequate adult guardianship compared with traditional (archaic lunacy) law are examined. This paper argues that these renovated models exhibit a dubious normative advance over traditional legislation. Specifically, the normative presuppositions of the reformed legislation, such as, restriction to an autonomy-paternalism framework, and the norms of the liberal individual and state, obscure important issues in at least two key areas which challenge the models' assumptions; namely, assessment and legal competence and assessment and need. The development of guardianship laws and of social arrangements that are more responsive to the life experiences of the elderly requires critical re-articulation of the nature of individuals and their communities.